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This thesis intends to explore the difference in how the real estate companies are financed between China 
and U.S, via a comparison case study of Vanke (万科, 000002 SHE) and AvalonBay Communities, Inc. 
(AVB NYSE). 
To answer that question, we have to explore in detail the financing needs of the two companies based on 
their operating conditions and financial dispositions. An evaluation on corporate capital efficiency is thus 
necessary. This thesis intends to analyze the two companies from perspectives of profitability, solvency 
and operating conditions. Furthermore, the analysis results are synthesized based on Financial Matrix model 
to explore the capital structure and financing needs of the companies.  
With the analysis results of the capital structure and financing needs of the companies, the thesis will 
explore the major external financing instruments applied in the companies, which hopefully indicates tip of 
the iceberg. The analysis will be developed with three basic questions: how are the instruments applied? 
How do the instruments help the development of the companies? What are the internal and external factors 
affecting the selection and usage of the instruments? Based on the analysis of financing instruments applied 
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Real estate companies conduct budgeting and financing based on their future target, operating and financial 
conditions. It is extremely crucial for the companies to apply appropriate financing tools and adjust itself 
into a robust capital structure. Besides, appropriate leverage may also improve the companies’ market 
performance and operating income. 
At present, compared with the capital market of developed countries, China's capital market development 
is still lagging behind, and the real estate business financing channels relies too heavily on bank loans. With 
the development of the domestic capital market, It is extremely important to address the questions of how 
China's real estate enterprises should seize the opportunity to broaden the financing channels, reduce the 
financing costs, control the financing risks and optimize the capital structure on the basis of the national 
macro-control and the bank's gradual Improvement of the threshold of corporate loans. 
Two recent trends in China raised our concerns on real estate financing. First, China’s government has been 
promoting PPP model nationwide. Second, China’s centrally state-owned enterprises, especially the giant 
ones which are under direct management of SASAC (The State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission of the State Council), have been undergoing a mixed ownership reform. Both 
of them indicate a shortage of funds project development in China, no matter in public or private market. It 
is no longer practical to develop a project without project financing, which means borrowing money from 
the investors, no matter equity or debt financing. The bank loans in China usually can require a 7-9 percent 
annual interest rate, which leads to a general shrink of the profit margin. For example, the net profit rate of 
China’s top 10 real estate companies in 2016 varies from 2% to 8% and only one of them earned a net profit 
margin larger than 8%. 
Meanwhile in the U.S, there is the world’s most developed finance systems and robust and prosperous real 
estate industry. Though in 2008, real estate financing in the U.S raised a global financial crisis and severely 
impacts global economy. With improved government regulations, the industry bounced back quickly 
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enough the presents its historical high prosperity. Besides, the real estate financing instruments in the U.S., 
such as REITs, CMBS, ABS, and etc., are being widely promoted over China. To examine the feasibility, 
it is essential to find out how these instruments work in its homeland on the American real estate companies. 
 
Figure 1Composite REIT Market Capitalization 
Given the conditions above, the thesis aims to conduct case studies on China and U.S. real estate companies 
and how they are financed. Given the mutual effects of financing instruments and the financial conditions 
of companies who practice them, it is equally significant to study their financial conditions and capital 
efficiencies of these companies. This thesis will be developed as two case studies on Chinese and American 
real estate companies, respectively Vanke (万科, 000002 SHE) and AvalonBay Communities, Inc. (AVB 





Study on the Financing Instruments Applied 
To compare the difference between the financing instruments and their impacts on the operating conditions 
on the companies, the analysis will be conducted respectively 1) on the scope of specific instruments and 
2) the scope of real estate companies.  
As for the instrument, the thesis intends to review the financing activities of case study companies over the 
recent 5 years from 2012 to 2017, and compare from the perspective of 1) total amount of funds raised, 2) 
financing periods, 3) financing cost and 4) financing risks. 
Generally speaking, corporate financing methods consists of internal and external financing. Internal 
financing refers to it that the company use its retained profits for investment. The retained profits mainly 
result from 1) net operating income (NOI) after tax and interests and 2) assets depreciation. External 
financing methods consists of 1) equity financing and 2) debt financing.  
 
Figure 2 Corporate Financing Methods 
This thesis is mainly concentrated on the external financing methods. As is indicated by the chart below, 
















Figure 3 Real estate financing in the US 
Meanwhile, based on the initial studies on China’s real estate financing industry, the main instruments 
applied can be indicated and summarized as below: 
 





























To fit the mainly applied financing instruments into the four quadrants of US real estate financing for the 
convenience of comparison, the illustration is indicated as below. (China’s real estate financing instruments 
highlighted in red). 
 
Figure 5 Real estate financing in China 
Due to the complexity of the effects financing instruments may have on capital efficiency of the companies 
that apply them, it is hard to say that the application of some specific financing instruments would lead to 
what kind of impacts on the companies. In addition, there is a reciprocal causation between the application 
of specific instruments and the financial conditions of the companies, which is also the concentration of 
this thesis, which is to reveal the reasons for the companies to select or not to select the instruments, and so 
what? It is necessary to combine the specific environment and the specific terms of the instruments so as to 






Selection of the Companies 
The selection of the companies to be studied follows multiple principles. Firstly, the company has to be 
public traded listed company with sufficient accessible financial disclosures for the convenience of study. 
Secondly, the company has to keep operating for at least 6 years, i.e. the companies was established before 
2012, without significant acquisitions, mergers, or bankruptcy so as to provide a constant and sustainable 
basis for research. Thirdly, the company should be of substantial scale with considerable market 
capitalization so as to prevent single significant projects, development, acquisitions or transactions causing 
material impacts to its overall operating conditions. Besides, the company should be representative in both 
applying diverse financing instruments and operating mainstream real estate business in the selected regions 
and thus intuitive for exploring the mainstream of real estate financing in the countries, i.e. China and the 
U.S. The last but not least, the selected company better outperform market, both on real estate and stock 
market, so as to potentially provide successive examples on applying financing instruments to promote 
capital efficiency. 
Based on the principles above, Vanke (万科, 000002 SHE) was selected for studying China’s real estate 
market. Vanke was established in 1984, started real estate business and went public in 1988. Specifically 
concentrating in multifamily housing development, Vanke has been the 1st rank annual revenue real estate 
company in China since 2004 till 2016. Besides, Vanke has long been practicing multiple financing 
instruments and actively trading in public capital market in domestic and overseas capital market, which 
may present us comprehensive and forward-looking instruments application. Besides, this thesis collected 
data from top 10 annual revenue companies in China and calculated a simple average of every indicator 
measurement in order to get a whole-picture idea of China’s real estate market and better position Vanke 
in the market. 
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AvalonBay Communities Inc. (NYSE: AVB) was selected for studying real estate market in the U.S. The 
company is a multifamily residential REIT founded in 1998 by a merger of Avalon Properties Inc. and Bay 
Apartment Communities Inc. AVB is the second largest residential apartment investment REIT in the U.S. 
AVB has outperformed VNQ, the comprehensive index indicator for American REITs, in terms of 1 year, 
3 years and 5 years. Besides, AVB operates mainly a leasing business, which is one of the most significant 
future industry that Vanke announced to operate in. A study on AVB may provide further insights on future 
growth pattern of Vanke and better comparison. 
In terms of analysis on the financing conditions on the scope of company, this thesis intends to evaluate via 
four dimensions, including its profitability, solvency, operating and financial matrix. To make the case 
study comparable to Chinese market metrics, I collected data from 2017 Chinese top 10 listed real estate 
companies with highest revenue, performed the identical calculations on them, and attained a simple 
average of the selected companies, including Vanke, who ranked 2nd after Country Garden (SEHK: 200).  
Profitability Analysis  
Profitability analysis is applied to evaluate the ability of the company to generate profits. The analysis is 
based on two indicators, respectively Net Profit Margin (NPM) and Return on Equity (ROE).  
Net profit margin is the ratio of net profits to revenues for a company or business segment. NPM indicates 
the ability a company collects profits from its revenue. NPM can be calculated as indicated below: 





𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 − 𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆1 − 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠 − 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑠 − 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠 − 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠
𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒
∗ 100% 
                                                     
1 COGS refers to Cost of Goods Sold. 
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Return on Equity (ROE) is the amount of net income returned as a percentage of shareholders equity. Return 
on equity measures a corporation's profitability by revealing how much profit a company generates with 
the money shareholders have invested. ROE can be calculated as: 




𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 − 𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆 − 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠 − 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑠 − 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠 − 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 − 𝑇𝑜𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
 
Solvency Analysis 
Solvency analysis intends to measure the ability of the company to repay its debts, both short-term and 
long-term debts. Short-term solvency will be evaluated by Cash Ratio and Quick Ratio. Long-term solvency 
will be measured by Debt to Asset Ratio (D/A ratio). 
The cash ratio, commonly used to calculate a company's ability to repay its short-term debt, is the ratio of 
a company's total cash and cash equivalents to its current liabilities. It can be calculated as: 
Cash Ratio =
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ + 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
=
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ + 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 +  𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑟 +  𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑦 𝐵𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑠 +  𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡  𝑇𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑠
𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡 − 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 + 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 + 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑒𝑑 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑠
 
The quick ratio is an indicator of a company’s short-term liquidity, and measures a company’s ability to 
meet its short-term obligations with its most liquid assets. Because we're only concerned with the most 
liquid assets, the ratio excludes inventories from current assets. Quick ratio is calculated as follows: 
Quick Ratio =
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 − 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
=
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠 + 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
 
Total debt to total assets is a leverage ratio that defines the total amount of debt relative to assets. This 
metric enables comparisons of leverage to be made across different companies. The higher the ratio, the 
higher the degree of leverage (DoL) and, consequently, financial risk. D/A ratio can be calculated as: 
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Operating analysis intends to evaluate the ability of the management team to use capital efficiently, 
represented by Inventory Turnover Rate and Accounts Receivable Turnover. 
Inventory turnover is a ratio of COGS to average inventory, showing how many times a company's 
inventory is sold and replaced over a period of time. Inventory Turnover indicates the liquidity of 






(𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑎𝑡 𝑏𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦 𝑎𝑡 𝑒𝑛𝑑)/2 
 
However, in evaluating AvalonBay Inc., such analysis on inventory turnover may not be properly applied 
without adaptation. The primary reason for this failure is that AVB is a public equity REIT, whose major 
business is to develop, redevelop and operate its portfolio properties, i.e. leasing the properties. To be 
qualified as a REIT, it is required by law that the company must derive income from primarily passive 
sources like rents and mortgage interest, as distinct from short-term trading or sale of property assets. 
Prohibited transactions are subject to 100% penalty taxation, such as sale of property held primarily for sale 
rather than long term investment. The transaction will be exempted from penalty taxation only if: (i) the 
property has been held for more than four years, and (ii) the aggregate adjusted basis of the property sold 
is smaller than 10% of the aggregate basis of all REIT assets. “Sale” is such a commercial activity that is 
typically categorized as active-income2 generating business, which by law is almost excluded from daily 
operating business of a REIT, the majority of whose income must be derive from primary ways. Given the 
restrictions listed above, typically there will not be neither Inventory nor COGS accounts reported on the 
financial statements of REITs companies. However, considering the importance of Inventory Turnover rate 
                                                     
2 The U.S. Internal Revenue Service broadly categorizes income into three types, active income, passive income, and 
portfolio income. Active income refers to income from performing a service, where there is material participation. 
Passive income is income generated from cash flows received regularly with minimal to no effort requirement on the 
recipient to maintain it. Portfolio income is investment income, including dividends, interests and capital gains. 
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in evaluating corporate management and hence capital efficiency and the significance it may brought up to 
us in the comparison between Vanke and AVB, I can still make some adaptions on it so as to retrieve a 





(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠) ∗ 𝐶𝑎𝑝 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 ∗ 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑂𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑦
𝑉𝑎𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑁𝑂𝐼 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 + (𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑠 + 𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑 ℎ𝑒𝑙𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡) ∗ 𝐶𝑎𝑝 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒
 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
= 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 & 𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 + 𝐴𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
+ 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑛 𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 
𝐶𝑎𝑝 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 =
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑡 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑦 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
 
Economic occupancy takes into account the fact that apartment homes of different sizes and locations within 
a community have different economic impacts on a community's gross revenue. Economic occupancy is 
defined as gross potential revenue less vacancy loss, as a percentage of gross potential revenue.  
𝑉𝑎𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑡 𝑁𝑂𝐼 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠 =
𝑁𝑂𝐼
𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑂𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑦
∗ (1 − 𝐸𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐 𝑂𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑦) 
Total Assets Turnover Ratio measures a company’s total revenue on sales generated relative to its assets. 
This ratio is commonly used as an indicator of the efficiency with which a company is deploying its assets 






(𝐵𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 +  𝐸𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)/2
 
Financial Matrix 
Financial matrix is widely applied in evaluation of a company in terms of capital efficiency and financial 
strategy. It is a two-dimensional coordinate system, whose y-axis indicates the effectiveness of value-add 
methods applied by the company, represented by EVA (Economic Value-Added), and x-axis suggests the 
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adequacy of current asset, represented by the difference between sales growth rate and sustainable growth 
rate. Combining the indicator of x- and y-axes, the matrix effectively reveals it whether the scale of current 
assets is adequate for the growth of the company. 
For y-axis, represented by EVA, can be calculated as: 
EVA = NOPAT3– WACC4 ∗ Total Capitalization 
𝑁𝑂𝑃𝐴𝑇 =  𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 + 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠 + 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠 − 𝑈𝑛𝑢𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠 (𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠)
+ 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐵𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 
WACC = Preferred Equity Costs ∗ % of Preferred Equity + Equity costs ∗ % of Equity + Liability Costs
∗ % of Liabilities ∗ (1 − Corporate Tax Rate) 
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔 − 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡 − 𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ
= 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 − 𝑀𝑎𝑥(0, 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠
− 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠) 
EVA takes the equity capital into consideration so that it can effective indicates actual income for the 
shareholders as a result of corporate management. It is quite common that the shareholders invest 
considerably on the company so as to make it expands fast in scale, ignoring the cost of equity shares. EVA 
excludes the impacts of capital investment by shareholders and thus it may suggest an actual value-add 
effectiveness of the company in a more reasonable and accurate way.  
For x-axis, represented by actual the difference between sales growth rate and sustainable growth rate, it 
can be calculated as: 
X = Sales Growth Rate − Sustainable Growth Rate 
 Sales Growth Rate =
Revenue of this year
revenue𝑜𝑓 𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟
− 1 
                                                     
3 NOPAT is an abbreviation for Net Operating Profit after Tax. 
4 WACC is an abbreviation for Weighted Average Capital Cost 
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Sustainable 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 = 𝑅𝑂𝐸 ∗ 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 = 𝑅𝑂𝐸 ∗ (1 − 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 − 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜) 
Revenue growth indicates the rate at which the company expands, while the sustainable growth rate 
indicates the growth of corporate internal financing capacity. X value is representative in evaluating the 
potential capital supply risk raised by company growth. That is to say that a positive X value suggests that 
the capital is in shortage for the company to maintain its current growth, or else the capital is adequate. 
 




CASE STUDY ON REAL ESTATE FINANCING IN CHINA: VANKE  
A Brief Introduction to Vanke 
Vanke (万科, 000002 SHE) was established in 1984, started real estate business and went public in 1988. 
Vanke is currently China’s largest and most successful real estate group, mainly focused on residential 
development, with highest annual sales revenue since 2007 till 2015. Besides, in terms of capital structure 
and financing tunnels, Vanke is also outstanding among China’s real estate companies for it has lowest 
bank loan proportion of total liabilities.  
There are 6 major financing tools in Vanke, bank loans (CNY 34.7 billion), stock (CNY 10.99 billion), 
oversea loans (￥8 Billion), trusts, real estate funds and M&A (mergers and acquisitions).  The highly 




Evaluation on Capital Efficiency of Vanke 
Profitability Analysis: Net Profit Margin & Roe 
Net Profit Margin  
Vanke has proved its well-above-market profitability by large historical spreads on net profit margin over 
the last 5 years. Though all the way decreasing and reached a historical low at 2016, Vanke’s net profit 
margin soared up in 2017 by 353 bps, a 30% year-on-year increase. The market comparable metrics 
experienced almost the same with Vanke, heading downwards till 2016 at its historical low and heads up 
in 2017, except for it that in 2014 the market indicated little signs of blooming. Given the calculation and 
the data, it can be concluded that Vanke does a better job in controlling costs, including operating expenses, 
sales costs, financing costs and others, from increasing relative to its revenue. 
 
Figure 7 Market and Vanke: Net Profit Margin 2012-2017 
Table 1 Vanke: Net Profit Margin 2012-2017 (in thousand CNY) 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Net 
Income 
¥15,662,588 ¥        18,297,549 ¥  19,287,524 ¥  25,949,438 ¥  28,350,255 ¥  37,208,387 
Revenue ¥96,859,914 ¥      127,453,765 ¥137,994,043 ¥195,549,130 ¥240,477,237 ¥242,897,110 
Net Profit 
Margin 


























Though Vanke ROE kept fluctuating during the past 5 years, it is always higher than market comparable 
by approximately 5%. While market kept performing worse off year on year, from 14.33% in 2012 to well 
below 12% most recently, Vanke returned its ROE varying from 16.64% to 20%. The comparison indicates 
that Vanke did better in balancing its capital structure and maximizing equity profitability. 
 
Figure 8 Market and Vanke: ROE 2012-2017 
Table 2 Vanke: ROE 2012-2017 (in thousand CNY) 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Net 
Income 
¥  15,662,588 ¥        18,297,549 ¥  19,287,524 ¥  25,949,438 ¥  28,350,255 ¥  37,208,387 
Equity ¥  82,138,195 ¥      105,439,423 ¥115,893,617 ¥136,309,617 ¥161,676,571 ¥186,673,939 



























Solvency Analysis: Quick Ratio, Cash Ratio and D/A Ratio 
Cash Ratio 
Market cash ratio remains stable around 10%, all the way down to its historical low of .08 in 2015 and 
heads up again, reached .10 in 2017. Meanwhile, Vanke’s cash ratio tends to vary more, blooming between 
2013 and 2015, bouncing back fiercely for short-term in 2014, and heading up after 2015. Vanke’s cash 
ratio is always well above market benchmark except in 2013, the spreads reached historical low by +.03. 
Higher cash ratio indicates that Vanke is of more cash relative to its current liabilities and thus more capable 
of payback its short-term debts. 
 
Figure 9 Market and Vanke: Cash Ratio 2012-2017 
Table 3  Vanke: Cash Ratio 2012-2017 (in thousand CNY) 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Cash & Cash 
Equivalents 
 
¥  51,120,224  
 
¥  43,004,149  
 
¥  62,751,658  
 
¥  53,302,576  
 
¥  87,490,789  
 














¥   847,355,430  


























Market quick ratio stayed stable over the last 5 years and waving around .39 by no more than .02. However, 
Vanke quick ratio experienced high variance over the same time spread, plummeted in 2013 by 23% and 
bounced back instantly the year after. It is reflected in its financial disclosure that Vanke encountered a 
significant current liabilities increase in 2013, mainly derived from 34% increase in accounts payable. It is 
also disclosed that the cash equivalents decreased by 16% over 2013, which is reflected in the cash ratio 
drop in 2013. Combining the 2 indices, it can be concluded that compared to market Vanke have more 
current assets relative to its current liabilities, and thus better short term solvency, expect for year 2013 
when Vanke experienced a financing crisis of shortage of cash and equivalents. 
 
Figure 10 Market and Vanke: Quick Ratio 2012-2017 
Table 4 Vanke: Quick Ratio 2012-2017 (in thousand CNY) 









































¥   847,355,430  
























Both Vanke and market D/A ratio has been increasing over the most recent years, indicating China’s real 
estate industry is adopting higher leverage. The only exception is that Vanke lowered its leverage in 2013 
and 2014 by a minimal change, compounded at no more than 1% y-o-y. It can be told from the balance 
sheets that though total liabilities kept increasing, the growth of total assets outpaced the liabilities and thus 
it appears that Vanke lowered its leverage over the years. In fact, Vanke added CNY 77 billion and 26% to 
its total financing in 2013. Besides, Vanke has long been bearing a higher debt relative to its total assets 
compared with market, indicating that Vanke might face more trouble in market downturn repay its long-
term debts, though partially offset by its better short term solvency. 
 
Figure 11 Market and Vanke: D/A Ratio 2012-2017 
Table 5 Vanke: D/A Ratio 2012-2017 (in thousand CNY) 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Total 
Liabilities 
¥296,956,661 ¥374,035,395 ¥392,515,138 ¥474,985,950 ¥668,997,643 ¥   978,672,979 
Total Assets ¥379,094,856 ¥479,474,818 ¥508,408,755 ¥611,295,568 ¥830,674,214 ¥1,165,346,918 
D/A Ratio 78.33% 78.01% 77.20% 77.70% 80.54% 83.98% 
 
  




















Operating Analysis: Inventory Turnover and Total Assets Turnover 
Inventory Turnover 
The inventory turnover of Vanke has been improving over the year between 2012 and 2016, during which 
the index almost doubled. However, in 2017, the index dropped from .41 to .30, the same level of year 2013. 
The financial disclosure indicates that the drop is due to both an increase in average inventories and a 
decrease in COGS. Such change in index suggests that the sales expansion over the last 5 years has 
significantly slowed down in 2017. The market also experienced difficulty in expanding their sales over the 
years except for 2015, the only year when market inventory rate headed upwards. Generally speaking, 
Vanke is superior to market in inventory turnover, suggesting better capital operating efficiency. 
 
Figure 12 Market and Vanke: Inventory Turnover 2012-2017 
Table 6 Vanke: Inventory Turnover 2012-2017 (in thousand CNY) 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
COGS ¥  65,454,228 ¥  92,814,352 ¥  102,557,064 ¥  138,150,629 ¥169,742,403 ¥   160,079,916 
Inventories 
at end 
¥329,731,930 ¥253,622,152 ¥  317,726,378 ¥  368,121,931 ¥467,361,336 ¥   598,087,658 
Inventories 
at beginning 
¥208,335,494 ¥329,731,930 ¥  253,622,152 ¥  317,726,378 ¥368,121,931 ¥   467,361,336 
Average 
Inventories 
¥269,033,712 ¥291,677,041 ¥  285,674,265 ¥  342,924,154 ¥417,741,633 ¥   532,724,497 
Inventory 
Turnover 























Total Assets Turnover  
Market total assets turnover has been heading downwards except for it in 2013. The case is far more volatile 
for Vanke, especially in 2017 when the index dropped by .09, 30%. Previously Vanke has been 
outperforming the market in 2015 and 2016 but slightly underperformed in 2017. The financial disclosure 
indicates that revenue growth for Vanke significantly slowed down. There used to be a 26% CAGR5 for 
Vanke’s annual gross revenue but was only 1% increase in 2017. To take a simple average over the last 5 
years, Vanke slightly outperformed market by .30 to .29, which indicates Vanke is more capable of 
generating revenue from its assets and has better efficiency in deploying its capital. 
 
Figure 13 Market and Vanke: Total Assets Turnover 2012-2017 
Table 7 Vanke: Total Assets Turnover 2012-2017 (in thousand CNY) 
  2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Revenue ¥  96,859,914  ¥127,453,765  ¥  137,994,043  ¥  195,549,130  ¥240,477,237  ¥   242,897,110  
Assets 
Beginning 
¥296,208,440  ¥379,094,856  ¥  479,474,818  ¥  508,408,755  ¥611,295,568  ¥   830,674,214  
Assets 
Ending 
¥379,094,856  ¥479,474,818  ¥  508,408,755  ¥  611,295,568  ¥830,674,214  ¥1,165,346,918  
Average 
Assets 
¥337,651,648  ¥429,284,837  ¥  493,941,787  ¥  559,852,162  ¥720,984,891  ¥   998,010,566  
Assets 
Turnover 
0.29 0.30 0.28 0.35 0.33 0.24 
                                                     


























Financial Matrix: Economic Value-Added (EVA) & Sustainable Growth Rate 
Y-Axis: EVA 
Figure 14 indicates the capital structure and capital expenses changes for China between 2012 and 2017.6 
It is quite surprising that how dramatically the capital cost may differ from our anticipation. In 2012, the 
financing costs of Vanke is 4.83%, well above 1.74% of equity cost. However, throughout the years after 
2013 debt costs dropped down and waved around 1.4% while equity costs soared up and stayed around 
4.7%, almost 3 times of it was. It turns out that the equity costs for Vanke is way much higher than debt 
costs, while the financing cost is so low that it is even lower than China’s benchmark interest rate, which is 
4.35% in April 2018. The revealed extremely low debt cost properly explained the motivation which drives 
up financial leverage of Vanke and China’s real estate industry.  
 
Figure 14 Vanke: WACC Composition 2012-2017  
                                                     
6 It is worth noting that total capitalization is defined as the sum of equity and long-term debt, net of net 
cash. The % debt indicator does not reflect a composition of total liabilities in Vanke’s capital structure but 
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Figure 15 indicates the change of Economic Value-Added over the recent years. In general, Vanke has 
performed an increasingly better job in sustaining EVA growth, with 16.20% CAGR between 2012 and 
2017, to increase company value. It is worth noting that in the market downturn between 2013 and 2016, 
Vanke gained an EVA 3-yr CAGR of 10.68%, with the average annual added value amount totals to 15.13% 
of its equity. Combining the analysis above, we can say that a superior capital structure along with its 
financing methods is the key to its success. 
 
Figure 15 Vanke: Economic Value-added 2012-2017 (in thousand CNY) 
 
Figure 16 Vanke: EVA growth 2013-2017 
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Table 8 Vanke: Economic Value-Added 2012-2017 (in thousand CNY) 
Vanke 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Net Income  ¥    15,662,588   ¥    18,297,549   ¥    19,287,524   ¥    25,949,438   ¥    28,350,255   ¥    37,208,387  
Income Tax  ¥    10,034,949   ¥      9,549,684   ¥      5,964,839   ¥      7,853,180   ¥    10,903,356   ¥    13,933,565  
Interests Ex  ¥      1,739,414   ¥      1,495,502   ¥         640,840   ¥         477,736   ¥      1,592,068   ¥      2,075,257  
EBIT  ¥    27,436,951   ¥    29,342,735   ¥    25,893,203   ¥    34,280,353   ¥    40,845,680   ¥    53,217,209  




 ¥      2,299,443   ¥      2,944,921  ¥       1,703,629  ¥       1,386,334  ¥       1,544,391  ¥       1,958,648  
Unusual 
Profits/Loss 
 ¥            42,993   ¥            22,607  ¥          210,113  ¥          524,198   ¥     -1,994,278   ¥     -4,915,545  
Deferred Tax  ¥      1,027,055  ¥          942,209  ¥          590,299  ¥          558,431  ¥          504,048  ¥          265,300  
NOPAT  ¥    30,764,748   ¥    33,254,135   ¥    28,030,441   ¥    35,739,153   ¥    44,926,014   ¥    60,401,158  
Debt Costs 4.83% 3.39% 1.39% 0.90% 1.86% 1.62% 
% Debt 30.49% 29.48% 28.48% 27.94% 34.59% 40.74% 
Equity Costs 1.74% 1.88% 4.46% 4.26% 4.97% 4.75% 
% Equity 69.51% 70.52% 71.52% 72.06% 65.41% 59.26% 
WACC 2.68% 2.33% 3.59% 3.33% 3.90% 3.47% 
Total Cap ¥   118,174,265  ¥    149,520,943  ¥    162,042,561  ¥    189,154,014  ¥    247,191,008  ¥   315,025,656  






The difference between sales growth and sustainable growth here has long been kept positive over the 
recent years, excluding 2014 and 2017, indicating that Vanke is at a shortage of capital and in need of 
external financing. Over the last six years, sustainable growth of Vanke stayed stable around 15%, varying 
by 3%. Meanwhile, sales growth presented greater volatility and fluctuated fiercely. It is worth noting that 
in 2014 and 2017, the identical years when Vanke is safe from capital shortage indicated by the X ratio, 
Vanke experienced historical low sales growth rates. We can conclude that in addition to the extremely low 
debt costs, the capital shortage is another reason that drives up Vanke leveraging. 
 
Figure 17 Vanke Sales-sustainable Growth: 2012-2017 
Table 9 Vanke: Sales Growth - Sustainable Growth 2012-2017 
  2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Revenue  ¥96,859,914   ¥127,453,765   ¥137,994,043   ¥195,549,130   ¥240,477,237   ¥242,897,110  
Sales 
Growth 
34.93% 31.59% 8.27% 41.71% 22.98% 1.01% 
ROE 19.07% 17.35% 16.64% 19.04% 17.54% 19.93% 
Retention 
Rate 
90.87% 89.17% 73.18% 77.60% 71.64% 76.17% 
Sustainable 
Growth Rate 
17.33% 15.47% 12.18% 14.77% 12.56% 15.18% 

























2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Sales Growth Sustainable Growth Difference
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Main External Financing Instruments of Vanke 
Bank Loans 
Though relatively lower the proportion of bank loans to total interest-bearing liabilities, bank loans remains 
the majority in Vanke’s interest-bearing liabilities. It is due to both 1) the convenience of bank loans, 
including high financing scales, moderate interest expenses, and its timeliness; and 2) the restrictions placed 
by government and market on other financing instruments. Except for year 2014, the total amount of bank 
loan borrowed kept increasing, which is the same case for its proportion to total interest-bearing liabilities. 
In 2017, bank loan proportion reached its historical high at 60.53%. As bank loans indicates its increasing 
importance to financing structure of Vanke, the concerns are raised that the over-reliance on bank loans 
may increase the risk that Vanke bears from government policy. Besides, from the public perspective, 
defaults on bank loans may deal substantial impacts on domestic economy. It is recommended for not only 
Vanke but also the entire real estate industry to diversify their financing sources and resolve their over-
reliance on bank loans. 
Table 10 Vanke bank loan changes: 2012-2017 
Year Interest-bearing liabilities (in CNY 
billion) 
Bank loan total amount 
(in CNY billion) 
% of bank loans 
2012 61.78 29.04 47.01 
2013 76.72 34.68 45.20 
2014 68.98 27.54 39.93 
2015 79.49 35.63 44.82 
2016 128.86 75.51 58.60 
2017 190,62 115.37 60.53 
Corporate Bonds 
Due to government’s suspension on equity financing in capital market, Vanke has turned to issuing 
corporate bonds and medium term notes. During the ten years from 2008 to 2017, Vanke has issued in total 
10 times, respectively five corporate bonds and five medium term notes, whose total amount sums up to 
CNY 22.7 billion with an weighted average annual interest rate of 4.7%7. The term of the issued bonds and 
                                                     
7 It is worth noting here that the interest rate is slightly lower than its 2017 equity costs of 4.75%, seems 
significantly higher than and contradicts our calculated debt costs of 1.62%. There are mainly 3 reasons for 
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notes are typically ranging from three to five years. Given the large financing scale, moderate financing 
costs, and its term feature, corporate bonds along with medium term note is one of the top choices for Vanke 
conducting medium to long term financing. 
Table 11 2008-2017 Vanke's new issuance of Medium term notes and corporate bonds in domestic capital market 
Year Instrument Total Amount (in CHY billion) Interest Rate (%) 
2008 Corporate Bond 2.9 7.0 
2008 Corporate Bond 3.0 5.5 
2014 Medium Term Note 1.8 4.7 
2015 Corporate Bond 5.0 4.5 
2015 Medium Term Note 1.5 3.8 
2015 Medium Term Note 1.5 3.8 
2016 Medium Term Note 1.5 3.2 
2016 Medium Term Note 1.5 3.2 
2017 Corporate Bond 3.0 4.5 
2017 Corporate Bond 1.0 4.5 
Total  22.7 4.7 
Domestic Capital Market 
Ever since 1989 when Vanke went public through IPO on Shenzhen Stock Exchange until in 2008 when 
Chinese government suspended authorizing listed real estate companies raising funds on capital market via 
equity financing, Vanke has operated equity financing 18 times, including IPO, secondary public offering, 
allotment, private placement, convertible bonds. The total amount raised by equity financing during the 20 
years summed up to approximately CNY 19.2 billion. 
Table 12 Vanke's equity financing 
Method Frequency Total Amount (in CNY million) 
IPO 2 479 
Secondary public offering 1 9,900 
Private placement 3 4,237 
Allotment 10 1,095 
Convertible bonds 2 3,490 
Total 18 19,201 
                                                     
such differences: 1) the interest expense of borrowed capital and invested in real estate development is 
qualified as capitalized interests and thus can be excluded from income statement and recorded in balance 
sheets; 2) some of unused borrowing can be used for short-term investments, whose income may offset part 
of interest expenses; 3) there is a tax shield effects on debt service interests payment. That is to say the 
interest payment is deductible for tax purposes, and thus further offset its interest expenses. 
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Though after 2014, China’s government abolished the suspension on listed real estate companies going 
equity financing on capital market, it placed multi restrictions on the usage of the funds raised. For example, 
the raised funds may only be invested in the development of real estate projects and must not be used to 
pay bank loan debt services or the ground leases. It turns out that as disclosed in its recent financial reports, 
Vanke has never performed equity financing afterwards. However, equity financing is of great significance 
to the development of Vanke in its initial stages. The raised funds of CHY 19.2 billion made it 16% of 
Vanke’s total assets of 119.2 billion, net of time value of the funds. 
 
Overseas Capital Market 
In 2013, Vanke B shares went delisting from Shenzhen Stock Exchange and went IPO on Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange in 2014. Its IPO on HKEx raised HK$17.62 billion, approximately CNY 13.90 billion. 
Besides, it has been issuing overseas corporate bonds via HKEx since 2013. There are in total times that 
Vanke issued corporate binds in overseas capital market, the total amount sums up to CNY 20.56 billion 
with a weighted average interest rate of 3.75%, 1% lower than the interest rate at which Vanke issued its 
corporate bonds and medium term note and 5% lower than real estate trust fund loans in domestic capital 
market. There are two major reasons for the moderate interest: 1) Vanke is of solid balance sheet, sound 
development and quite good credit record, and thus has high ratings when issuing corporate bonds; 2) 
Vanke mainly raises funds from developed capital market, where the benchmark interest rate is often 
lower than it is in China. During the 5 years, Vanke got financed from overseas capital market for CNY 
7.63 billion per year, which is approximately 30% of its annual net income over the same period. 
Overseas capital market proves to be a superior financing method to Vanke in the total amount raised, 




Table 13 Vanke issuing corporate bonds on overseas capital market 
Year Currency 
Total Amount (in 
million origination 
Currency) 






2013 Singapore Dollars 140 672 4 3.275 
2013 China Yuan 1,000 1,000 5 4.50 
2013 China Yuan 1,000 1,000 3 4.05 
2014 USD 400 2,448 5 4.50 
2016 HKD 1,375 1,174 3 2.50 
2016 HKD 625 534 3 2.50 
2016 HKD 1,650 1,408 3 2.50 
2016 USD 220 1,461 5 2.95 
2016 USD 600 3,984 3 3.95 
2017 USD 1,000 6,880 10 3.975 
  
Highlight: Vanke Joint Development 
Vanke joint development refers to it in a real estate project development, Vanke cooperates with other 
real estate developer and establish a joint venture, where Vanke typically performs as a general partner, 
invests a minority of total invested capital but takes the absolute control over the project. After the 
development is completed and project revenue reaches a certain percentage of total expected sales 
revenue, Vanke quits the joint venture and takes: 1) management fees as a percentage of the sales 
revenue; 2) a share of project profits accordingly with Vanke’s equity share; 3) the excess return of the 
project after its profit exceeds a certain number. 
Via joint development, Vanke may deploy its expertise in real estate development and maximize their 
return on invested capital. The limited partner in the joint venture are often the ground lease owners, the 
funders, or both. Given the scarce of scarcity of valuable lands in China, Vanke tends to consider ground 
lease owners as the top priority. In the joint venture with ground lease owner, Vanke usually establish a 
joint partnership and the LP will authorize Vanke absolute control over the project development. In a joint 
venture with the funders, the cooperation starts from purchasing a ground lease from the government 
together, and then a joint venture as mentioned above will be established. 
In project income distribution, a waterfall structure as suggested as the diagram below is widely applied. 
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Table 14 Vanke Joint Development Income Distribution 
Accounts Amount 
Management Fee 2.5% of Sales Revenue 
General and Administrative Fees 4.0% of Sales Revenue 
Equity Income Accordingly with equity shares 
Excess return incentive The part of project income that exceeds a given amount will 
be split according to beforehand negotiation 
Short term debt service 15% annualized interest rate 








% of Joint 
Development 
As GP with 
Minority 
Equity Share 
% of Minority GP 
2013 104 69 66% 12 11.5% 
2014 41 36 87% 16 39% 
2015 105 88 83% 37 36% 
2016 173 157 90% 75 43% 
2017 216 203 94% 88 41% 
 
In 2013, Vanke started its very first joint development project in Kunming, Yunnan Province. In this 
development, Vanke established a joint development company with Zhelian Properties, the ground lease 
owner. Vanke invested CNY 23 million and took 23% equity share of the project, and took an absolute 
control over the development. In addition to the equity investment, the project was financed by the 
contractor, Yunnan 3rd Construction and Engineering Corporation, a state-owned construction company. 
The contractor financing for the joint development covered 60% of its external financing and totaled CNY 
160 million with 3.2% annual interest rate and no mortgages nor 3rd party guarantees, given the long-term 
cooperation relationship between Vanke and Yunnan 3rd CEC. The rest of external financing, which 
summed up to CNY 106 million, was covered by a one-year mortgage bank loan from China Construction 
Bank with 8.5% annual interest rate. 
Vanke started the planning and design of this project at the same time when Vanke was negotiating with 
the cooperator, Zhelian Properties, which saved two months for the construction. Immediately after the 
negotiation was settled down, construction started and took in total only five months. As the construction 
began, Vanke started the sales of the project and more than 43% of its total housing units was sold. Within 
six months after the construction completed, Vanke realized 95% sale of its total expected sales revenue 
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and quit the joint development. The whole process of this project took Vanke approximately thirteen months 
and CNY 23 million of total investment. Vanke realized a revenue of CNY 227 million and 987 ROIC8. 
The income distribution is indicated as below. 
Table 16 Income distribution of Kunming Joint Development Project, 2013 
Accounts Vanke Zhelian Properties 
Project total sales revenue 1557 
Equity share 23% 77% 
Project income distribution 84 281 
Management Fees 39 25 
Excess return 87 0 
Short term debt service 17 0 
Total income 227 306 
In % 43% 57% 
The project made Vanke realize the great potential interests in joint develop with advantages in land 
acquisitions, limited capital investment, high turnover, and most importantly: extremely high ROIC. The 
cooperation model was widely applied in Vanke development afterwards and in 2017, the joint development 
took 94% of its total new projects. 
Supplementary on Real Estate Financing Instruments in China 
In addition to those applied by Vanke, there are other multiple major real estate financing instruments in 
China, without which we may fail to gain a whole-picture view of the industry. Below are considered as 
the most important ones applied by the top companies in China. 
REITs: Poly Properties (保利地产) 
Though in 2013, Vanke announced that it launched the very first REIT in China, Penghua Qianhai Vanke 
REIT. However, though legislation concerning REITs differs in different countries and regions, it cannot 
be properly named as a REIT for the following reasons: 1) Penghua REIT is a non-public traded fund with 
an expected maturity of eight years, while REITs are usually public traded investment trusts that are 
expected to operate forever or without a foreseeable termination. 2) Penghua securitized the claim to the 
                                                     
8 ROIC: Return On Invested Capital 
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future income of the properties instead of the properties themselves like the other REITs traded globally. 
Given the conditions above, Penghua REIT is more similar to a CMBS aimed at financing the underlying 
property, a CNY 8 million office property. Though Penghua REIT is a good attempt of Vanke to explore 
alternative financing method, given its uniqueness I did not contain it in the section Main External 
Financing Instruments of Vanke. 
In March 2018, Poly Real Estate (600048. SH) launched the first leasing REIT in mainland China. The 
REIT launch securitized part of Poly’s leasing residential brands, including “N plus”, “Nuoya”, and “Hexi” 
apartments, respectively located in Guangzhou, Chongqing, Beijing, Changsha, Dalian and Shenyang. The 
total amount raised summed up to CNY 1.72 billion, including preferred asset-backed stock shares of CNY 
1.55 billion for public trading and subordinate ABS shares of CNY 172 million, privately held by the 
property owner. The preferred shares, rated at AAA, will be mature in nineteen years and paid with 5.88% 
annualized interest rate. Though compared with 5.3% of the average interest rate of 7-yr AAA rated 
corporate bonds and considering the spread in their maturity, the expected return on this Poly-REIT is 
relatively low. The concerns were still raised about how Poly may not default on this REIT, given the 
residential market cap rate 9  in China is no more than 2%. Considering the expected income of the 
underlying properties equals the property appreciation plus its leasing income minus operating expenses, it 
has to be that the annualized property appreciation is significantly larger than 5.88% - 2% = 3.88% so that 
Poly will be enough incentivized to pay the debt services. Besides, there is another concern for the investors 
that Poly is short of cash and unable to refinance itself and thus fail to pay its debt services though the 
appreciation of the underlying property is enough to have it incentivized and unwilling to give up interest 
on it. Besides, though the REIT mortgaged with the underlying properties, a market downturn may lead to 
a drop in property value and potentially make the investors lose their investment on the REIT, given the 
                                                     
9 Cap rate: refers to the ratio the net operating income of one property to its property value. Cap rate is commonly 
used to price or evaluate profitability of the underlying properties. 
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leverage is so high on this transaction. (Poly-REIT leverage can be simply calculated as the ratio its 
preferred ABS shares to its subordinate shares, which is CNY 1,550 to CNY 172 = 9.01). 
Though significant risks underlying, Poly-REIT is still a good experiments in financing real estate in China, 
which brings up not only the potential opportunities, but also the intuitions that how China’s government 
may further strengthen their regulations on real estate financing and protect the interests of the investors. 
Perpetual Bonds: Evergrande Group (恒大集团) 
Perpetual bonds refers to the bonds that mature in more than 30 years or the bonds without maturity, which 
makes the issuer only need to pay back the interests, not the principals. Correspondingly, the characteristics 
of perpetual bonds include: 1) high fixed or floating interest rate; 2) usually with no underlying mortgage 
or other guarantees; 3) it is subordinate to all other debts and senior to preferred equity; 4) according to 
Hong Kong Accounting Standards10, perpetual bonds are reported in the company’s equity, instead of debts, 
while the interests are reported as dividends payout. Perpetual bonds, though at relatively high financing 
expenses, are needed by the companies with financing needs and extremely high leverage but lacking the 
effective methods to reduce its debts via equity financing. The conditions mentioned above is commonly 
seen around China’s real estate companies, which makes perpetual bonds useful and necessary. 
Take Evergrande Group (3333 HKG) as an example, in 2013, the company for the first time reported the 
account Perpetual Capital in its cash flow statement and the account kept growing for the following years. 
In 2013, to finance its development project in Beijing, Evergrande entrusted Ping’An Bank to issue a 
perpetual bond that totals CNY 5 billion with the first year interest rate of 12%, second year interest rate of 
13% and the third year and after interest rate of 18%, with its underlying development property mortgaged. 
The figure below indicates the changes to perpetual capital in Evergrande Group. In the first four years 
through 2013 to 2016, the new issuance kept expanding and totaled CNY 107.2 billion, which is 57% of its 
                                                     
10 Many of China’s real estate companies went public in Hong Kong due to the restrictions on them going public in 
mainland China, and thus they report their financial statements according to Hong Kong Accounting Standards. 
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revenue, 64% of its equity and 8% of its total assets in 2016. Meanwhile, the debt services also expanded 
and reached its peak in 2015 and took 24% of its net new issuance, i.e. new issuance minus redemption. In 
2017, Evergrande redeemed all of its existing perpetual capital with CNY 113 billion cash. As suggested 
by 2017 transaction records, there is a mechanism buried in Evergrande perpetual bonds issuance neglected 
in our previous discussion, which is a call option by the issuer, i.e. Evergrande. The issuer may execute the 
call option to buy back all the perpetual bonds issued from the lender and thus the interest of the borrower 
is protected to the maximum extent. By calculating the sum, it can be found that Evergrande paid no more 
than 4% of the total amount borrowed to redeem all its perpetual capital. Compared with a prepayment 
penalty buried in a traditional mortgage loan designed to protect the rights of the lenders, the call option 
exposes lenders to the prepayment risk without a proper protection at extremely low cost for the borrower. 
 
Figure 18 Perpetual capital account changes of Evergrande: 2013 – 2017 (in one million CHY) 
Table 17 Perpetual capital account changes of Evergrande: 2013 – 2017 (in one million CHY) 
 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 SUM 
New Issuance 24,367 26,347 44,322 59,754 - 154,790 
Redemption - -960 -20,902 -25,789 -113,667 -161,318 
Interests 
distributed 
- 1,897 5,623 5,728 - 13,248 
% of int. to 
net new 
issuance 




















2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
New Issuance Redemption Interests distributed % of int. to net new issuance
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To sum up, the perpetual bonds applied by Evergrande is a real estate financing instrument that can be 
counted as both debt and equity financing. From the lender’s perspective, the call option mechanism left 
lenders exposed to prepayment risk without proper protection methods. As for the borrower, the instrument 
is so costly compared to both debt and equity financing average expenses. Though the perpetual capital 
may not be reported as liabilities in its financial statement, the leverage risks for the real estate companies 
may not be properly offset by issuing perpetual bonds and thus it is only making the financial statement 
“prettier” without actual enhancement. It is no more than an alternative financing instrument applied by 
highly leveraged real estate companies who is of no effective equity financing tunnels, which is largely due 
to restrictions on real estate companies refinancing their projects via public capital market. 
Conclusion on other major real estate financing instruments in china: 
The two cases above are similar in that the real estate companies are searching for an alternative financing 
methods for equity financing, due to the government restrictions on real estate companies going equity 
financing on China’s domestic capital market. The REITs cases, though strictly speaking none of the 
mentioned is a real REIT, suggest attempts made by China’s RE companies to securitize their properties so 
as to raise funds for potential development chances. The perpetual bonds case indicates costly efforts made 
to deleverage the companies while financing them. Both cases raise our concerns on the government 
restrictions on equity financing in China’s real estate companies and the risk transferring during alternative 
equity financing experiments. 
To summarize the restrictions and correspondingly the difficulties Chinese real estate companies encounter 
when searching for equity financing, it is necessary to review the related policies. In 1993, State Council 
of PRC released information indicating that it was not encouraged for real estate companies to go public, 
which is widely thought as the 1st ban issued by China’s government. In 1997, CSRC announced “Notices 
on Stock Issuance from CSRC”, saying that CSRC will not accept IPO applications from finance and real 
estate companies for then. Though no further clarification was announced, in 2000 China’s Ministry of 
Housing and Urban-Rural Development recommended 3 real estate developer companies respectively in 
35 
 
Beijing, Shenzhen and Tianjin to CSRC, which was regarded as the very first signals released from China’s 
central government that the ban on real estate companies going public may be cancelled. In 2003, the ban 
on real estate companies going public was officially withdrawn. Since then, there have been in total 125 
listed real estate companies in securities exchange of mainland China  and 52 listed in Hong Kong 
Exchanges and Clearing Limited (HKEx, established in 1986), which totals 177 listed real estate companies. 
However, till 2016, there were more than 600 real estate companies IPO applications submitted to CSRC 
and waiting for review. To go IPO, CSRC requires on the company’s gross assets, annual revenues, net 
profits, capital structure, financial disclosures, use of funds and etc. Besides, CSRC review responds to 
government policies. For example, R&F Properties (SEHK: 2777), a Hong Kong listed top 20 real estate 
developer in China mainland, has applied for IPO in mainland China for 5 times since 2007 but and 
eventually failed the fifth attempts. Silian Li, R&F’s chairman of the board, told that given government 
restrictions on RE companies going IPO, CSRC review always takes much too long and left the company’s 
capital structures out of its optimal status, forcing them to suspend the application. 
Analysis on Financing Vanke11 
Though the fact continues to hold true that an over reliance of Vanke on bank loans, indicated by an 
expansion of bank loan borrowed by Vanke both in absolute amount and its percentage of total financings 
that year, Vanke is applying increasingly diversified financing instrument year on year. 
Equity financing was applied mainly before 2008, which is resulted from government restrictions on the 
feasibility for listed real estate companies to go refinancing through public capital market. Though the 
restrictions were partially removed in year 2014, government has placed new restrictions on the usage of 
funds raised through equity financing on public capital market. For example, the funds cannot be used for 
ground lease acquisitions, which usually makes up more than 40% of the total expense of project 
development and more than 70% of development in China’s 1st tier cities. According to my personal 
                                                     
11 This analysis intends to identify the pros and cons on Vanke’s current financing instruments. It is to be 
found as the research goes. 
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experience in internship on 2017 summer, R&F properties, a top 20 real estate development company in 
China, acquired three ground leases in Beijing with a projected weighted average costs of more than CNY 
34,000 per square meter on the future development according to government zonings on the acquired land, 
lots. Meanwhile, government has also placed a sales pricing cap on the completed project on the lands of 
approximately CNY 47,000 per square meter, which makes the potential ground lease acquisition costs at 
least 72.3% of its total cost, assuming R&F will not lose money on the developments. Vanke has never 
performed equity financing on domestic public capital market after 2008 as disclosed in their annual 
financial reports, which has been a great foster for company growth during the 20 years since Vanke’s IPO 
in 1989 and until the government suspension on listed real estate companies go refinancing on public 
domestic capital market. 
Debt financings, including bank loans borrowing, corporate bonds issuance on both domestic and overseas 
capital market, made up a majority of annual total financing for Vanke. According to our calculation of 
Vanke’s weighted average capital costs, net effective debt costs is approximately 1.62%  after considering 
the effects of capitalizing the interests, short term investment income and tax shields. Compared with the 
equity cost of 4.75% in year 2017, debt financing is superior to equity financing in three aspects: 1) 
significantly lower capital costs; 2) flexibility in terms, amounts and 3) free of concerns about diluted 
control rights over the company. As of the year of 2017, Vanke has raised CNY109.52 billion through debt 
financing, 58.7% of its total equity that year. However, there are also concerns that the highly leveraged 
capital structure might adversely impact Vanke on a market downturn and impair the rights of both the 
investors and shareholders. 
In distributing risks, cutting down required capital and maximizing ROIC, Vanke has made several attempts 
and Vanke Joint Development is the most successful one and has been widely applied during the four years 
since its first perform in 2013 to 2017, percentage of total involved projects increasing from approximately 
10% in 2013 to 41% in 2017. Vanke Joint Development referred here mainly indicates it that Vanke invests 
a limited capital, takes a minority of the joint venture on the project and holds absolute control over the 
37 
 
development of that project. Via charging a management fee and collecting waterfall structured project 
income, Vanke has gradually convert its role from an operator in a capital-intensive industry to a service 
provider in an intelligence-intensive industry. It is worth noting that Vanke has also realized considerable 
profits of short term debt service in the joint development project due to the difference between 15% of 




CASE STUDY ON REAL ESTATE FINANCING IN THE U.S.: 
AvalonBay Inc. 
A Brief Introduction to AvalonBay Inc. 
AvalonBay Communities, Inc., founded in 1998 by a merger of Avalon Properties Inc. and Bay Apartment 
Communities Inc., is a best of class public traded equity REIT long devoted in developing, redeveloping, 
acquiring and operating multifamily apartment the U.S. In 2018, AvalonBay, with Market capitalization of 
$22.47 billion, owns and operates in total 77,614 apartment units in New England, the New York City 
metropolitan area, the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area, Seattle, and California, which are the best 
residential markets in the U.S. 
Evaluation on Capital Efficiency of AvalonBay Inc. 
Profitability Analysis: Net Profit Margin & ROE 
Net Profit Margin 
It is found that AVB has always a significantly higher Net Profit Margin relative to Vanke. The NPM for 
AVB is varying around 40%, 3 times as it is of Vanke, whose NPM varies around 13%.  
 

























Table 18 AVB Net Profit Margin 2012-2017(in $000) 
  2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Net Income $   423,562  $    352,771  $    697,327   $    741,733   $   1,033,708   $      876,660  
Revenue  $1,000,627   $1,462,921   $1,685,061   $1,856,028   $   2,045,255   $   2,158,628  
Net Profit 
Margin 
42.33% 24.11% 41.38% 39.96% 50.54% 40.61% 
 
It is noted that in 2013, AVB NPM dropped greatly by 40% compared to the year before, which is due to 
the expanded revenue and a shrinkage in net income.  As AVB financial report revealed it, in 2013 all the 
expenses expanded significantly. The top three accounts by absolute value for the expense expansion are 
respectively depreciation expenses, property taxes and expensed acquisitions, development and other costs. 
It is announced that in year 2013, AVB performed series of acquisitions and developments at the same time 
of disposals of less profitable properties. It is also reflected by its expanding revenue and increasing leasing 
occupancy. 
 
Figure 20 2012-2013 AVB Expenses composition 
ROE  
The trends in ROE changes are in line with its NPM, partially due to the higher volatility in net income 






























contrary to NPM, AVB presents a lower ROE compared with Vanke, which is due to Vanke’s higher 
leveraged capital structure. This will be specifically discussed in Solvency Analysis. 
 
Figure 21 AVB ROE 2012-2017 
Table 19 AVB ROE 2012-2017(in $000) 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Net Income $    423,562 $    352,771 $    697,327 $    741,733 $   1,033,708 $      876,660 
Equity $6,840,793 $8,599,727 $9,046,405 $9,840,526 $10,171,416 $10,388,046 

























Solvency Analysis: Quick Ratio, Cash Ratio and D/A Ratio 
Cash Ratio 
It is noted that in 2012, AVB cash ratio was so high that its cash and equivalents was more than its current 
liabilities. It is revealed in its statement of cash flows that in 2012, AVB made a secondary public offering 
of common stock shares, added its market cap by 20% and raised $2.43 billion cash. Taking year 2012 out 
and it is found that except for year 2015, AVB cash ratio is generally lower than Vanke by a simple average 
of .04 and 25%. It indicates that AVB has less cash relative to its current liabilities, and is less capable of 
paying its short term debts. Besides, it can be found that the cash & cash equivalent accounts is running 
low year-on-year, which can be both a sign of fully deployment of capital and a probable short term 
solvency crisis. Last but not least, compared with Vanke, AVB runs a routine of new common stock share 
issuance to raise cash from capital market annually. The cash ratio comparison here gives out an explanation 
of this AVB secondary public offering routine, which the capital market system in the U.S makes it feasible. 
 
Figure 22 AVB Cash Ratio 2012-2017 
Table 20 AVB Cash Ratio 2012-2017(in $000) 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Cash & Cash 
Equivalents 



























$   2,318,916 $   4,070,028 $   4,055,049 $   3,181,423 $   3,166,956 $   2,109,482 
Cash Ratio 1.20 0.09 0.15 0.16 0.10 0.10 
Quick Ratio 
Due to the unusual common stock share issuance in 2012, Figure 23 reflects a similar drop in quick ratio 
as cash ratio. Taking 2012 out, it is shown that the AVB quick ratio is generally heading downwards, 
indicating a decreasing short-term solvency of AVB. Besides, in comparison with Vanke, AVB quick ratio 
is significantly lower, by .30 in simple average and approximately 70%, suggesting that AVB is more 
vulnerable to short-term solvency risks than Vanke is.  
 
Figure 23 AVB Quick Ratio 2012-2017 
Table 21 AVB Quick Ratio 2012-2017(in $000) 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Current Asset $   2,927,493 $      577,127 $      809,877 $      704,523 $      586,911 $      455,284 
Inventories12                 -                     -                     -                  -                     -                     -    
Current 
Liabilities 
$   2,318,916 $   4,070,028 $   4,055,049 $   3,181,423 $   3,166,956 $   2,109,482 
Quick Ratio 1.26 0.14 0.20 0.22 0.19 0.22 
                                                     
12 There are two major reasons for the absence of Inventories in quick ratio: 1) as an equity REIT company, AVB 
derives its primary income from passive sources and has no such concept of “Inventory” in its operating and financial 
statements; 2) though we calculated a substitute afterwards in the discussion of Operating Analysis: Inventory 























D/A Ratio  
As is indicated in Figure 24, AVB is approximately geared at 40% and slightly increasing over the years. 
Both total liabilities and assets constantly expanding with moderate D/A ratio, AVB is of a generally solid 
and sound balance sheet, along with qualified long term solvency capability.  Comparing with Vanke, AVB 
D/A ratio is significantly lower by .37 in simple average absolute amount and 54%, indicating a better long 
term solvency as well. The leverage comparison here also gives out the answer to the question raised in 
Profitability Analysis: Net Profit Margin & ROE, i.e. why AVB ROE is so much lower than it is of Vanke, 
given a significantly higher net profit margin? The most plausible answer is that Vanke is so much leveraged 
with an extremely limited equity share of total capital structure. The leveraging makes the denominator of 
ROE small enough to present a high ROE even though given a small net income, which is the numerator. 
High leveraging makes Vanke extremely profitable in good scenario expectation of market, which has been 
most of the case of real estate industry in China, and vulnerable during a market downturn, while AVB is 
moderately leveraged and takes a risk premium accordingly and slightly better to the risks it bears.  
 
Figure 24 AVB D/A Ratio 2012-2017 
Table 22 AVB D/A Ratio 2012-2017(in $000) 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Total Liabilities $   4,312,258 $   6,711,096 $   7,081,408 $   7,080,782 $   7,688,089 $   8,020,719 
Total Assets $11,160,078 $15,328,143 $16,140,578 $16,931,305 $17,867,271 $18,414,821 





















Operating Analysis: Inventory Turnover and Total Assets Turnover 
Inventory Turnover 
AVB inventory turnover fluctuated with great volatility over the last years. Analyzing the factors separately, 
it can be found that it consolidated COGS was waving around $75 million and slightly heading upwards, 
while inventories almost all the way increasing and doubled from 2012 to 2017. It seems that the trends in 
inventory turnover suggests that AVB may encounter problems in sales, i.e. to promote leasing and increase 
occupancy.  
 
Figure 25 AVB Inventory Turnover 2012-2017 
Table 23 AVB Inventory Turnover 2012-2017 (in $000) 
AVB 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Applied  
Cap Rate 
5.9% 4.9% 5.0% 5.1% 5.2% 5.2% 
Economic 
Occupancy 
96.1% 96.2% 95.8% 95.6% 95.4% 95.5% 
Revenue $  1,000,627 $  1,462,921 $  1,685,061 $  1,856,028 $  2,045,255 $  2,158,628 
NOI $     667,928 $     977,998 $  1,134,096 $  1,215,742 $  1,383,943 $  1,490,068 
NOI/Revenue 66.75% 66.85% 67.30% 65.50% 67.67% 69.03% 




$     755,363 $  1,286,715 $  1,241,832 $  1,569,326 $  1,201,026 $     979,947 
Acquisitions $      155,755 $     839,469 $       47,000 $                   - $     393,316 $     462,317 
Capital Ex on 
RE Assets 




























$        52,989 $      101,375 $        63,982 $        78,863 $        82,414 $        74,810 
       
Vacant Loss $        27,106 $        38,632 $       49,720 $        55,955 $        66,731 $        70,213 
Construction in 
progress 
$      802,779 $   1,583,120 $   1,417,107 $   1,592,917 $   1,306,300 $   1,882,262 
Land held for 
development 
$      316,037 $      300,364 $      180,516 $      484,377 $        68,364 $        84,293 
Average 
Inventories 
$        93,116 $      130,923 $      129,601 $      161,897 $      138,214 $      172,473 
       
Inventory 
Turnover 
0.57 0.77 0.49 0.49 0.60 0.43 
Studying the composition of AVB Average Inventories, it is found that the vacant loss, indicating its loss 
due to vacancy, takes only a minimal fraction of its total inventories. The greatest fraction is attributed to 
construction in progress. The account kept on expanding, suggesting a growing development pipeline of 
AVB. Considering the expanding land help for development, the trends on inventory turnover rates can be 
explained as a value-add strategy adopted by AVB management team to enlarge development, given the 
high occupancy of AVB apts. It is worth noting that AVB economic occupancy maintains at 95% level, 
indicating an improving leasing conditions for AVB, given the new deliveries keeps adding in yearly. 
 
Figure 26 Composition of AVB inventories on NOI13 generating basis, 2012-2017 
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Vacancy Loss Construction in progress Land held for development
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Total Assets Turnover 
AVB assets turnover stays around .11 and heads upwards. During the 6 years, both AVB assets and revenue 
doubled and its revenue increases at a slightly higher growth rates. However, in comparing, Vanke 
apparently performed better with 3 times of total assets turnover. In addition to a different capital structure, 
the sales business Vanke operates can be a plausible explanation, which AVB is prohibited from conducting 
as a primary business to be qualified as a REIT. 
 
Figure 27 AVB Total Assets Turnover 2012-2017 
Table 24 AVB Total Assets Turnover 2012-2017(in $000) 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Revenue $     1,000,627 $     1,462,921 $     1,685,061 $     1,856,028 $     2,045,255 $     2,158,628 
Assets 
Beginning 
$     8,482,390 $   11,160,078 $   15,328,143 $   16,140,578 $   16,931,305 $   17,867,271 
Assets Ending $   11,160,078 $   15,328,143 $   16,140,578 $   16,931,305 $   17,867,271 $   18,414,821 
Average 
Assets 
$     9,821,234 $   13,244,111 $   15,734,361 $   16,535,942 $   17,399,288 $   18,141,046 
       
Assets 
Turnover 
























Financial Matrix: Economic Value-Added (EVA) & Sustainable Growth Rate 
It is the same as Vanke that equity costs of AVB kept increasing while debt costs headed downwards, and 
the debt costs for AVB is also lower than it is for Vanke. Besides, AVB WACC kept growing steadily over 
the last five years. AVB debt costs is around 2.7% annually from 2012 to 2017, almost in line with U.S. 
10-yr Treasury rates. However, its equity costs increased from 5.3% to 7.4%, significantly higher than it is 
in Vanke and drove AVB high ignoring the lowering debt costs. Comparing AVB equity costs with its ROE 
we can find that it is almost the same over the years. Given: 
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 =  𝑅𝑂𝐸 ∗ 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 
We can see that the dividend payout rate is extremely high in AVB. It is because that to be qualified as a 
REIT, AVB has to distribute more than 90% of its taxable income as dividends to the shareholders, or else 
its income is subject to corporate income tax, which is exempted currently. Though taxable income takes 
in depreciation costs, which makes it significantly lower than its actual income, given that the properties 
prices are often increasing rather than depreciating, the dividend payout mechanism makes it more difficult 
to realize value add for AVB and all REITs. 
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Table 25 AVB Financing Costs 2012-2017(in $000) 
AVB 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
% Debt 33.11% 41.68% 41.77% 39.62% 40.87% 41.37% 
Financing 
Expenses 




4.04% 2.81% 2.78% 2.72% 2.67% 2.72% 
Table 26 AVB Equity Costs 2012-2017 
AVB 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Dividend 
Payout 
$      365,572 $      526,050 $      593,643 $      655,248 $         726,749 $    772,657.00 
Equity $   6,840,793 $   8,599,727 $   9,046,405 $   9,840,526 $    10,171,416 $    10,388,046 
% Equity 66.89% 58.32% 58.23% 60.38% 59.13% 58.63% 
Equity Costs 5.34% 6.12% 6.56% 6.66% 7.15% 7.44% 
Figure 295 clearly illustrates the difficulty mentioned above in value adding for REITs like AVB. Unlike 
Vanke, who makes a majority of NOPAT its EVA, AVB spent most of it on capital costs, and mainly equity 
costs. Especially in 2013, capital costs was higher than AVB NOPAT by $173 million and 32.9%. AVB 
operating failed to add value to its assets. It is also reflected in Profitability Analysis: Net Profit Margin & 
ROE. As we previously discussed, in 2013 AVB expenses enlarged, mainly property taxes, depreciation 
costs and acquisition & development, due to series of acquisition and disposal of properties. After 2013, 
the effects of such transactions can be found in the NOPAT increase and positive EVAs. 
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Table 27 AVB Economic Value-Added: 2012-2017 (in $000) 
AVB 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Net Income $      423,562 $      352,771 $      697,327 $      741,733 $      1,033,708 $         876,660 
Income Tax $                   - $                   - $          9,368 $          1,483 $                 305 $                 141 
Interests Ex $      136,920 $      172,402 $      180,618 $      175,615 $         187,510 $         199,661 
EBIT $      560,482 $      525,173 $      887,313 $      918,831 $      1,221,523 $      1,076,462 
NOPAT $      560,482 $      525,173 $      875,551 $      916,998 $      1,221,163 $      1,076,289 
       
Debt Costs 4.04% 2.81% 2.78% 2.72% 2.67% 2.72% 
% Debt 33.11% 41.68% 41.77% 39.62% 40.87% 41.37% 
Equity Costs 5.34% 6.12% 6.56% 6.66% 7.15% 7.44% 
% Equity 66.89% 58.32% 58.23% 60.38% 59.13% 58.63% 
WACC 4.91% 4.74% 4.98% 5.10% 5.31% 5.49% 
       
Total Cap $ 10,227,174 $ 14,745,118 $ 15,536,112 $ 16,297,474 $    17,202,296 $    17,717,516 
       







Unlike Vanke, AVB sustainable growth stays low, around 1%, as a result of high dividend payout and low 
retention rate. On the other hand, its revenue growth is relatively high, around 10% however decreasing 
over the years. The 2013 is also an outlier due to unusual transactions. A positive X-value indicates that 
AVB has been in capital shortage for all the years since 2012. One of the reasons for the difference between 
Vanke and AVB is that, as we previously discussed, the dividend payout mechanism. For REITs like AVB, 
internal financing is significantly limited and thus it has to rely on external financing. 
 
Table 28 AVB Sales Growth - Sustainable Growth 2012-2017(in $000) 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Revenue $   1,000,627 $   1,462,921 $   1,685,061 $   1,856,028 $   2,045,255 $   2,158,628 
Sales Growth 6.89% 46.20% 15.18% 10.15% 10.20% 5.54% 
       
ROE 6.19% 4.10% 7.71% 7.54% 10.16% 8.44% 
Retention 
Rate 
13.69% -49.12% 14.87% 11.66% 29.69% 11.86% 
Sustainable 
Growth 
0.85% -2.01% 1.15% 0.88% 3.02% 1.00% 
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Main External Financing Instruments Applied By AVB from 2012 To 2017 
Major financing needs for AVB are: 1) to cover its development and redevelopment costs of real estate 
projects that AVB engaged in; 2) to cover the minimum dividend payment required to be qualified as a 
REIT; 3) to cover its debt service and principal payment at maturity or prepayment to avoid defaults which 
may adversely impact their credit ratings; 4) other operating expenses and capital expenditures incurred. 
Compared with Vanke, AVB is more in shortage of funds. There two major reasons for this shortage. On 
the one hand, the dividend payout mechanism makes it impossible for AVB to depend on its internal 
financing. On the other hand, the X value of financial matrix indicates that AVB is out of capital to sustain 
its current growth, which has been shrinking over the past years. Combining the solvency analysis above, 
we can find that AVB is more capable of paying back long term debt rather than short term loans. To 
conclude, generally speaking, AVB needs reliable, stable, predictable long term financing. 
Bank Loans 
Unlike Vanke, AVB finances its operating with only a minimal fraction of bank loans. As revealed in its 
financial disclosure, between 2012 and 2017, AVB borrowed only three unsecured term loans from 
commercial banks. The specific terms for these bank loans are indicated as the table below. The amount 
raised from bank loans takes respectively 46% and 15% of AVB total debt financings that year. Besides, 
the absolute amount raised also decreased over the years. The difference in deploying bank loan financing 
between Vanke and AVB is partially resulted from a far more developed capital market in the U.S, where 
the financial institutions provides better corporate financing services in amount, terms, debt service fees 
and etc. than it in China. It is worth noting that the pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, endowment and 
other long term investor has an appetite for real estate properties for its steady risk-adjusted returns. Another 
reason for the difference in reliance on bank loans can be that a majority of debt financing from banks for 
AVB are issued via credit facilities with a syndicate of commercial banks. Compared with mortgage and 
unsecured loans, the credit facility is of higher flexibility and moderate interest requirement, which will be 
introduced in the following section: Credit Facility. 
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Table 29 AVB Bank Loans Borrowing, 2012-2017 
Year  Type Amount (in $000) Interest Rate Maturity 
% of debt financing 
that year 
2014 Unsecured Term Loan $              300,000 Variable 2021 46% 
2017 Unsecured Term Loan $              100,000 LIBOR14+0.90% 2022 6% 
2017 Unsecured Term Loan $              150,000 LIBOR+1.50% 2024 9% 
Credit Facility 
AVB is engaged in a revolving variable rate unsecured credit facility, issued by a syndicate of banks. As of 
Jan. 2018, the credit facility allows AVB to borrow up to $1,500,000,000 at a variable interest rate, currently 
LIBOR + 0.825 and effectively 2.4%. Besides, the credit facility charges 0.125% facility fee, which is 
$1,875,000 annually based on the $1,500,000,000 facility size and current rating of AVB. The credit facility 
provides AVB with material short term liquidity at extremely low costs. However, it is also flawed in usage 
due to its term, which is typically no more than one year. Given our calculation on AVB solvency analysis, 
AVB is more capable of pay long term debt services rather than short term ones. The inferred inability 
seems a plausible explanation for the cautious and limited execution of the credit facility usage. 
Table 30 AVB Variable Rate Unsecured Credit Facility: 2012-2017 
Credit 
Facilities 
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Amount $       750,000 $   1,300,000 $   1,300,000 $  1,500,000 $ 1,500,000 $ 1,500,000 















Effective 1.25% 1.21% 1.22% 1.25% 1.60% 2.40% 
Facility rate 0.18% 0.15% 0.15% 0.13% 0.13% 0.13% 
Facility fees $           1,313 $          1,950 $           1,950 $         1,875 $        1,875 $        1,875 
Outstanding $         42,575 $        66,396 $         47,963 $       50,299 $      45,342 $      62,465 
Due date Jan. 2013 Jan. 2014 Jan. 2015 Jan. 2016 Jan. 2017 Jan. 2018 
 
 
                                                     
14 LIBOR: London Interbank Offered Rate. It is a benchmark interest rate widely applied by capital market globally. 
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Corporate bonds and notes payable 
Corporate bonds takes a majority of AVB debt financing instrument. Except for year 2014, the total amount 
raised by corporate bonds kept increasing. The decrease in 2014 was resulted from both the unsecured bank 
loans (46% of total financing that year) and equity financing increase (32% of that year, consists of both 
common stock share issuance and CEP III15). From 2012 to 2017, corporate bonds provided AVB an 
average annual financing of $915 million, a weighted average 57% of its total financing. It is worth noting 
that in 2013, 2016 and 2017, corporate bonds provides more than 80% of AVB’s total external financing. 
A concern about AVB’s over-reliance on corporate bonds is raised and AVB probably needs a 
diversification on its financing sources for risk minimizing. In addition, unsecured notes, rather than 
mortgage loans, is the main instrument applied by AVB, as a result of its credit ratings, sound financial 
positions and public optimism towards real estate market. 
 
Figure 30 AVB Corporate Bonds Issuance and % of total financing 2012-2017 
Table 31 AVB Corporate Bonds Issuance and % of total financing 2012-2017 
 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
Mortgage notes 
payable 
$              - $   84,928 $   53,000 $              - $              - $    206,800 
Unsecured notes $    700,000 $750,000 $250,000 $    873,088 $1,122,488 $1,446,826 
Total Amount $    700,000 $834,928 $303,000 $    873,088 $1,122,488 $1,653,626 
% 22% 99% 32% 56% 99% 82% 
                                                     
15 CEP III stands for a 3rd commencement of Continuous Equity Program, mainly discussed in section Capital Market. 
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In terms of financing cost, I summarized all related issuance of loans and notes payables. As indicated by 
the table listed below, a majority of corporate bonds AVB issued are fixed rate loans, whose weighted 
average effective interest rates is 3.56% over the years, approximately 1% higher U.S 10-yr Treasury rate. 
There is no significant difference in interest rate between mortgage and secured notes. In addition, to secure 
and hedge the risks of floating rate note, AVB entered into forward interest rate swap agreement on a yearly 
routine basis. Besides, the corporate bonds issuance conditions in AVB also fostered out previous analysis 
that due to its capital structure and income distribution mechanism, AVB is substantially in need of long 
term financings. The weighted average term of its bonds issued are 11.25 year, which definitely indicates 
a long term note. 
Table 32 AVB mortgage loans and unsecured note payable issuance 2012-2017 





Mortgage note $                11,958 4.61% 2018 6 
Unsecured note $              450,000 4.30% 2022 10 
Unsecured note $              250,000 3.00% 2023 11 
2013 
Secured Mortgage loan $                15,000 3.06% 2018 5 
Secured Mortgage loan $                56,210 3.08% 2020 7 
Unsecured note $              400,000 3.79% 2020 7 
Unsecured note $              350,000 4.30% 2023 10 
2014 
Unsecured Term Loan $              300,000 Variable 2021 7 
Secured Mortgage loan $                15,000 2.99% 2024 10 
Secured Mortgage loan $                38,000 LIBOR+2.00% 2024 10 
Unsecured note $              300,000 3.50% 2024 10 
2015 
Unsecured note $              525,000 3.45% 2025 10 
Unsecured note $              300,000 3.50% 2025 10 
2016 
Secured Mortgage note $                67,904 4.18% 2020 4 
Unsecured note $              475,000 2.95% 2026 10 
Secured Mortgage note $                70,507 3.38% 2019 3 
Unsecured note $              300,000 2.90% 2026 10 
Unsecured note $              350,000 3.90% 2046 30 
2017 
Unsecured Term Loan $              100,000 LIBOR+0.90% 2022 5 
Unsecured Term Loan $              150,000 LIBOR+1.50% 2024 7 
Unsecured note $              400,000 3.35% 2027 10 
Unsecured note $              300,000 4.15% 2047 30 
                                                     
16 Effective rates includes the issuance costs and commissioning fees. 
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Secured Mortgage loan $                21,700 LIBOR+1.35% 2020 3 
Unsecured note $              300,000 LIBOR+0.43% 2021 4 
Unsecured note $              450,000 3.20% 2028 11 
 
Capital Market  
AVB has been performing active equity financing activities through issuance of common stock shares 
during the recent years. Its equity financing is volatile both in amount and % of total financing. During 
2012-2017, AVB raised an average of $599 million from capital market annually, which took a weighted 
average of 37% of its total financing then year.  
 
Figure 31 2012-2017AVB Issuance of Common Stock & % of Equity Financing (in $000) 
Table 33 2012-2017AVB Issuance of Common Stock & % of Equity Financing (in $000) 




$2,430,190 $     4,703 $346,134 $    690,184 $      15,526 $    111,093 
Equity % 78% 1% 36% 44% 1% 6% 
Though as we previously discussed, equity financing for AVB is costly, given the high dividend payout 
ratio required to be qualify as a REIT. However, the issuance of new common stock shares will not add up 
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Issuance of common stock Equity %
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has no direct relationship with the specific amount of funds raised. A potential impact of equity financing 
is that via stock share issuance, AVB original stock shares are diluted, which results in a potential decrease 
of both AVB stock prices and dividends paid per share. The impaired return will adversely impact the public 
market confidence in AVB and cause trouble to its further equity financing activities. It is extremely 
important for AVB to balance the benefits of fund raising and the potential impacts of investment return 
along with the public confidence loss. 
In addition to authorized common stock issuance, AVB is engaged in a continuous equity program (CEP). 
The most recent of such program is the fourth continuous equity program, commenced on 2015, which pre-
authorized AVB management to sell up to $1,000,000,000 of its common stock from time to time. CEP 
makes it possible for AVB to conduct equity financing activities on a routinely basis. The specific terms 
and sales conditions are indicated as below. 
Table 34 AVB CEP commencement and sales condition, 2012-2017 










CEP II Nov. 2010 Nov. 2013 $    500,000 July. 2012 $     492,49017 $    127.36 
CEP III Aug. 2012 Aug. 2015 $    750,000 -- $     397,63318 $    144.20 
CEP IV Dec. 2015 -- $1,000,000 -- $    105,478 $    188.39 
Analysis on Financing AVB  
There are two major characteristics concerning financing conditions of AVB, both of which is related to its 
qualification as a REIT. Firstly, it is required that AVB has to pay out 90% of its taxable income as 
dividends to shareholders, or else it will be taxed. The dividend payout requirement makes it a must for 
AVB to search for external financing methods. Another characteristic of AVB is the shortage of cash and 
cash equivalents, which is also partially due to another qualification for REITs that a majority of its income 
has to be derived from passive sources, which prohibited it from active transactions on real properties, in 
                                                     
17 The difference between total amount and net sales proceeds is mainly expensed as commissioning fees for sales 
agents at a 2% of the gross sales basis. 
18 From 2013 to 2015, for the purpose of Archstonre Acquisition, AVB issued a substantial additional amount of 
common stock shares and gained no sales proceeds on CEP III except for the year of 2014. 
57 
 
addition to the dividend payout mechanism. Such shortage is reflected in its solvency analysis, by a 
relatively low cash ratio and quick ratio, and makes AVB less capable of paying its short term debts. 
Combing the two characteristic above, AVB has to turn to long term external financing instruments to foster 
its growth. 
Concerning financing AVB, there are mainly four instruments applied, respectively bank loans, credit 
facility, corporate bonds and public capital market. Both bank loans and credit facility are issued through 
commercial bank sources. Credit facility is of low financing expenses costs, large financing amount, high 
flexibility and a relatively short term, which does not typically exceeds one year. Such characteristics makes 
it that credit facility instrument a supplementary for AVB short term liquidity needs. Bank loans take a 
minimal fraction of total financing and thus will be discussed in section Corporation bonds. 
Corporate bond is the most important financing instruments of AVB, which makes up a majority of its debt 
financing. As the result of AVB’s high credit ratings, moderate indebtedness, and a widely-spread optimism 
over real estate market, AVB issued most of its corporate bonds at relatively low expenses, high ratings, 
without mortgages or guarantees. The bonds were issued with an weighted average term of 11.3 years, 
representing a relatively long term financing and can be even longer in case of refinancing.  
The last but not least, equity financing, primarily issuance of new common stock shares, is the most costly 
financing instruments with highest expenses according to our previous calculation. However, ideally 
speaking, a total cost of equity, i.e. the dividends paid, will not increase no matter how much new common 
stock shares issued. It will be cheap enough if issued at the amount large enough, when both its dividends 
and stock prices are diluted and investor return significantly impaired. A public confidence loss in 
investment in AVB will also adversely impact its future equity financing potentials. That is will the 
management team has to balance between the benefits of the funds raised via equity financing, and the 
impact of diluted returns.  
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COMPARISON STUDY BETWEEN VANKE AND AVALONBAY 
As comprehensively indicated by Vanke, AVB, and all other cases involved and discussed above in this 
thesis, I personally conclude the difference between China and U.S. real estate financing as illustrated by 
the following table. 
Table 35 Comprehensive differences in real estate financing between China and U.S 
 Indicators Vanke (China) AVB (U.S.) 
Profitability 
NPM 14.15% 39.82% 
ROE 18.26% 7.36% 




Cash Ratio 0.16 0.12 








Inventories 0.34 0.56 






EVA 76% 9% 
Capital Costs 24% 91% 
Financing Terms 3-5 years More than 10 years 
Sales Growth 23.41% 15.69% 
Sustainable Growth 14.58% 0.81% 
Capital Shortage 8.83% 14.88% 
Main instruments Applied Debt Financing 
Diverse Debt and Equity 
Financing Instruments 
 
What Is The Difference In Capital Efficiency? Why? 
To sum up from the analysis above, there are two major reasons for the difference in capital efficiency of 
AVB and Vanke. The first reason is the difference in capital structure, i.e. the extent to which the company 
is leveraged. The second reason is that due to the dividends payout requirement, AVB has limited retained 
earnings which results in a shortage of cash and cash equivalents. 
AVB is better in profitability compared Vanke given the significant difference in net profit margin, which 
indicates the capability of a company to control its expenses relative to its revenue. Though ROE 
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comparison tells us a different story, it is due to a substantially higher leverage in Vanke and lower equity 
share, as the denominator of ROE calculation. By applying an analysis of ROA19, as indicated in the figure 
below, except for year 2013 when AVB practiced material acquisition and dispositions of its portfolio 
properties, AVB is of a higher ROA compared with Vanke. 
 
Figure 32 Return on Asset of AVB and Vanke, 2012-2017 
According to solvency analysis, AVB is more capable of paying back long term debt service, revealed by 
lower D/A ratio. Due to limited resources of cash and cash equivalents, compared with Vanke, AVB is less 
capable of paying back short term debt services. Such difference in solvency capabilities is reflected in their 
financing structures and strategies. As for AVB, though authorized with low cost short term credit facility, 
considering its shortcoming in short term solvency, AVB does not adopt a strategy of deploying leverage 
value with the low cost credit but uses it disciplinarily, which is reflected by its year-end amount and its 
percentage of outstanding credit facility. As for Vanke, it seems that due to the difference in accessibility 
between short term and long term financing instruments, they proactively adopt such a strategy that to keep 
abundant cash and current asset in hand so as to adapt itself into better short term solvency. 
                                                     
19 ROA: Return On Assets, indicates the ability of a company to deploy its assets in generating net profits. 
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
AVB 3.80% 2.30% 4.32% 4.38% 5.79% 4.76%











The result for operating analysis differs. AVB has better inventory turnover, indicating better capability of 
AVB to improve “sales” and deploy values from its inventories, including delivering development pipelines 
and decreasing vacancy loss. This conclusion is further fostered by the analysis results that AVB is on 
purpose expanding its development pipelines to ensure future deliveries in bullish market, which at the 
same time increases its inventories and thus AVB inventory turnover could have been even higher. Vanke 
does better in total assets turnover. An explanation for this is that as a residential real estate developer, 
Vanke is good at promoting its housing sales and realize greater revenue relative to its assets. Besides, there 
is a hint for Vanke that the difference in total assets turnover can be resulted from a systematic reason that 
sales model with high turnover may better maximize company revenue than leasing business does, which 
is also the difference in operating focuses of Vanke and AVB. As declared in Vanke annual report, it is 
converting itself from a housing retailer to a comprehensive housing service provider combining sales and 
leasing. The transformation may probably adversely affect its turnover and thus revenue and furthermore 
its ability to deploy its assets in generating income for the shareholders. 
Financial matrix study reveals far more complicated and comprehensive results. As revealed by its Y-axis, 
i.e. the Economic Value-Added, Vanke has done substantially better than AVB does. Vanke realized better 
WACC management and a majority of NOPAT contributes to the EVA and makes the company materially 
growing. However, as for AVB, the dividend payout mechanism makes it difficult to collect and retain its 
operating income for further company growth. From the perspective of a short term shareholder, the payout 
mechanism maximizes their interests at the price of impeding long term company growth. EVA analysis 
on AVB tells a story of how a best of class residential REIT cautiously strives to realize value adding while 
maximizing shareholder gain during each single financial period, which is admirable from my personal 
perspective. 
Besides, as revealed in the X-axis, both AVB and Vanke are in shortage of funds to sustain their current 
growth. Though in 2014 and 2017, there have been positive X value for Vanke, it can be found by no more 
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than a single glance on its data composition that the so-called funds adequacy is due to its weakened revenue 
growth in market downturn.  
To sum up the conclusions of financial matrix analysis, both AVB and Vanke is located in the 1st quadrant, 
suggesting both are growing companies with increasing asset value and capital shortage. A major takeaway 
from the financial matrix is that sound and sustainable financing are critical to the two companies to 
maintain their current growth, though the condition for AVB is more difficult. 
 




What Is The Difference in Financing Instruments Applied? Why? 
Comparing AVB and Vanke, it is found that one of the major difference in financing is that Vanke applies 
primarily debt financing with extremely limited equity financing between 2012 and 2017, while the 
financing structure for AVB is more diversified, as a combination of material equity and debt financing. As 
we can conclude it, this difference in method applied is mainly due to a major limitation of China’s domestic 
capital market for listed real estate companies, where the RE companies are discouraged   substantially by 
the restrictions on usage of funds raised. In contrary, the financing conditions in the U.S is far more loose 
for AVB, where AVB can conduct new common stock share issuance on a daily routine basis on the free 
will out of its actual financing needs, than it is in China for Vanke. 
Concerning the debt financing instruments applied, Vanke is much too reliant purely on bank loans, which 
is subject to government policy risks especially in China, where most of available commercial banks are 
state-owned. As for AVB, it applies a combination of comparable bank loans, corporate bonds and credit 
facility and the percentage of each instrument applied is based on its financing needs and fluctuated 
substantially year on year. Besides, due to the difference of the applied debt financing instruments between 
AVB and Vanke, there is another considerable difference in the term of loans borrowed. As for Vanke, who 
mainly borrows money from China’s commercial banks via an approval system, the usage of the funds 
borrowed is restricted on specific project development, which is usually no more than one year. The debt 
financing structure of Vanke makes its debt borrowed mainly short to medium term, which is subject to 
short term solvency risks in case of, for example, a major postpone of project completion. The situation is 
different for AVB, who applies a diversified debt financing instruments, mainly consisting of corporate 
bonds. The bonds can be issued based on its actual financing needs. For example, AVB can issue a project 
development loan to finance a specific project development, redevelopment or acquisition. The term of 
such loans typically varies from three to five years. AVB can also issue bonds for the purpose of its overall 
company operating needs, whose term is usually five to ten years, and even more. It is reflected by a 
weighted average loan term of 11.7 years of the loans issued by AVB through 2012 to 2017. 
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Considering the financing costs, i.e. weighted average capital costs, it is surprising that Vanke is of a 
significantly lower WACC than AVB as of 2017, by 3.47% to 5.49%, which is different from my 
anticipation. There are two major reasons for such anticipation: 1) Vanke mainly operates in a developing 
country, where the benchmark interest rate is higher than it is in the U.S, where AVB operates. As for the 
ten years between 2008 and 2018, China’s benchmark interest rate varied from 7.5% to 4.3%, while the 
comparable in the U.S varied from 3.5% to 0.3%. 2) Vanke, with D/A Ratio waving around 80%, is 
substantially more leveraged than it is for AVB, whose D/A Ratio varies around 40%. I expected it that as 
for Vanke with higher leverage, the credit ratings will be significant lower than it is for AVB, which is true 
that most recently Vanke was rated BB while AVB rated A, and correspondingly the lender might ask for 
a higher risk premium for making loans to Vanke, which means higher interest rate. The analysis above 
gives out such explanations: 1) As for real estate companies like Vanke and AVB, the debt expenses can 
be low due after subtracting the capitalized interests, short term investment gains and tax shields effects 
from it. Often their equity costs is higher than debt costs in WACC calculations. 2) In terms of equity costs, 
AVB has to pay 90% of its taxable income to shareholders as dividends so as to be qualified as a REIT and 
exempted from corporate income taxes, which Vanke does not have to distribute and may keep its income 
for further development. The mechanism drives up AVB equity costs relative to Vanke. 3) In terms of debt 
cost, one of the plausible reason can be found in the Kunming Joint Development given. In that case, the 
contractor provides the joint venture with unsecured loans, whose interest rate is significantly lower than 
China’s benchmark interest rate then, covering 60% of the total development cost. Such conditions that the 
contractor proactively provides loans to the property owner are rarely seen in the U.S. It is also reflected 
by Figure 14 Vanke: WACC Composition 2012-2017, which indicates a significant drop in debt cost from 
4.83% in 2012 to 3.39% in 2013, when Vanke starts to apply and promote the joint development model, 
and followed by 1.39% in 2014.20 
                                                     
20  Such relationship between debt cost drop and application of joint development is indicated by the author as a 




Based on the analysis and the inferences above, there are multiple take-ways that are worth noting. 
First, the business model matters. Given the limitation of low market cap rate applied in China property 
leasing market, the development of rental business is severely impeded and most of China’s real estate 
companies operate as a developer, while the U.S market is more diversified with a far more developed 
leasing market. As suggested by net profit margin analysis as well as the comparison between ROA and 
total asset turnover, China’s real estate developers encounter higher revenue along with even higher 
expenses and thus lower net profits, compared with their peer companies in the U.S. 
Second, financing costs are lower in China than it is in the U.S and commonly equity costs are lower than 
debt costs, which is surprisingly different from our anticipations. As for the spread in financing costs 
between China and the U.S, it is due to the difference in preference for maturity in debt financing, i.e. 
Chinese real estate companies prefer short term debts while those in the U.S prefer long term ones. Besides, 
the U.S companies, especially the REITs, are required and willing to distribute higher dividends to its 
shareholders. The collective effects of above dive up financing costs in the U.S relative to it in China. As 
the spread in equity costs and debt costs, it is because the debt costs, represented by interest payment, are 
offset by 1) capitalized interests; 2) short term investment income; 3) tax shield effect. Take Vanke as an 
example, its interest expenses and its reduction in 2017 can be illustrated by the following pie chart: 
 





income, ¥2,503 , 
27%
Exchange profit 
and loss, ¥358 , 
4%
Interest Expense, 
net, ¥2,075 , 23%
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Thirdly, China’s real estate companies apply most debt financing instruments while those in the U.S. applies 
more diversified instruments, including debt and equity financing. It is mainly due to restrictions placed by 
China’s government on real estate companies going public and raising funds on capital market, which left 
Chinese RE companies highly leveraged and in extreme need for “equity-like” debt financings. The two 
financing instruments discussed in Supplementary on Real Estate Financing Instruments in China provide 
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